

— JANUARY 17, 2020 —

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURE ON PAGE 44

Executive Summary

Overview

Apartment operating fundamentals enjoyed another year of stability in '19, with most major markets successfully absorbing elevated levels of construction. Landlord pricing power is not as strong as it was earlier in the cycle, but it remains relatively healthy in a low-growth commercial real estate world. Most property sectors are experiencing a deceleration in operating fundamentals, driven in part by a moderation in broader economic growth (the pace of which surprised favorably more times than not in recent years). While there are no current discernible cracks in apartment fundamentals, the risk of oversupply will rise in the next few years. National apartment completions are expected to remain remarkably steady around cyclical highs, each year, for the next five years. Development deliveries will likely be met by softer population growth of key-renter cohorts and a moderation in employment growth. Sub-inflation market rent growth on average over the next five years remains our base case.

The apartment transaction market is currently enjoying ample liquidity, which appears likely to continue in '20. Apartment cap rates edged lower in most markets in '19, and the relationship between apartment yields and prevailing investment grade and high-yield bond rates suggest the bias for cap rates, if any, is lower. Geographically, bidding tents are fullest in large Southeast and Southwest metros, while coastal markets are relatively unloved. Private market apartment returns look attractive versus fixed-income alternatives, and apartments appear fairly valued versus other real estate sectors in both the private and public market.

Key Takeaways

- Our 5-year base case economic outlook is characterized by positive, but slowing GDP growth (~1.8%)
- Solid '19 fundamentals were supported by ~175k jobs/month, est. 40% fewer over next 5 years
- No large changes to our household formation ests. (slowing) and homeownership forecasts (sideways)
- Apartment operating fundamentals should see a cooling from a mid-3% rent growth world to mid-1%
- The demographic picture is full of cross currents, with the tailwind for apartments likely to ease
- Delayed life events and poorly positioned renter balance sheets should insulate fundamentals to a degree
- But, the "millennial boom" is fading; a deceleration in 25-34 year old growth is inevitable
- Apartment developers are not adjusting to the softer demand outlook. Pockets of oversupply will rise
- Modest gateway Market-RevPAF growth (change in rents & occ) outperformance is expected
- The transaction market is on firm footing; the bias for cap rates (if any) is likely lower (higher values)
- Significant Sun Belt market cap rate compression results in more attractive IRRs along the coasts
- The D.C. metro (the District and NoVa) is our top market of choice for private apartment investors
- Private market values: apartments look cheap vs. fixed income alternatives, fair vs. other property sectors
- Public market apartment values: apartment REITs look fairly valued vs. other property sectors

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
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I. U.S. Apartment Outlook Summary

Set to Slow: Apartment M-RevPAF growth (combines occ. and rent) is expected to slow in the coming years from mid-3% observed in '18 and '19 toward sub-inflation levels. Our out-year estimates are modestly lower versus the forecast set a year ago due to incremental concern over the pace of multifamily construction, which is currently not slowing enough to accommodate a moderation in demand that should play out early this decade.

U.S. Apartment Market-RevPAF* Growth - Top 50 ■ Apartment — Major Sector Average (Ind, Office, Strip, excl. Apt)



Market-RevPAF Growth Momentum

(2020E vs. 2019)




*M-RevPAF growth combines changes in effective rents and occupancies into a single measure.

Source: CBRE and Green Street Advisors.

I. U.S. Apartment Outlook Summary (cont'd)


Market	Annualized M-RevPAF Growth	● '20E '20E-'24E	Employment Growth '20E - '24E	Supply Growth '20E - '24E	M-RevPAF Growth Rank '20E	M-RevPAF Growth Rank '20E - '24E
Boston	2.8%	3.6%	•	+	4	1
Seattle	2.6%	3.4%	++		7	2
Phoenix	2.6%	4.99	%	-	1	3
San Diego	2.4%	3.4%	+	++	9	4
San Jose	2.3%	2.2%	+	++	39	5
Charlotte	2.3%	2.4%	++		31	6
Austin	2.2%	3.1%	++		12	7
Los Angeles	2.2%	3.1%	i -	++	13	8
Dallas / Fort Worth	2.2%	2.9%	+	_	16	9
D.C. Metro	2.1%	2.2%		•	38	10
Denver	2.1%	2.6%	+		23	11
Philadelphia	2.1%	2.6%		•	24	12
New York	2.1%	2.9%	•	++	17	13
San Francisco	2.1%	1.5%	+	+	46	14
Las Vegas	2.0%	3.8%	++	+	3	15
Indianapolis	2.0%	4.1%	•	-	2	16
Orange County	2.0%	3.0%		+	14	17
San Antonio	1.9%	3.6%	++		5	18
Raleigh-Durham	1.9%	2.5%	++		29	19
Richmond	1.9%	2.8%			19	20
			+	-	10	21
Nashville	1.9%	3.3%	i T			
Honolulu	1.9%	2.2%		++	40	22
Orlando	1.9%	2.3%	++		34	23
Inland Empire	1.8%	2.8%	++	•	18	24
Miami	1.8%	2.8%	i -	•	21	25
Salt Lake City	1.8%	3.0%	++		15	26
Oakland-East Bay		1.9%	•	•	42	27
Columbus	1.7%	2.5%	•	•	28	28
Houston		.8%	+	•	43	29
Sacramento	1.7%	2.3%	+ +	+	36	30
Portland	1.6%	3.4%	+	-	8	31
Palm Beach	1.6%	2.6%	•	•	25	32
Atlanta	1.5%	2.3%	•	-	35	33
Cleveland	1.5%	3.2%		++	11	34
Tampa-St. Petersburg	1.5%	2.4%	-	-	32	35
Minneapolis	1.5%	2.3%	-	-	37	36
Baltimore	1.5%	2.6%	-	+	26	37
New Jersey (Northern)	1.4%	2.5%		++	27	38
Louisville	1.4%	2.4%	i -	+	33	39
Cincinnati	1.4%	2.8%	-	+	22	40
Pittsburgh	1.4%	2.5%		•	30	41
Fort Lauderdale	1.3%	1.9%	•	•	41	42
Detroit	1.3%	3.5%		+	6	43
Long Island	1.3% 0 1.1%			++	49	44
Kansas City	1.1% 0.9%		!		50	45
Memphis	1.1%	0		-	47	46
Chicago	1.0%			++	48	47
Jacksonville	0.9%	7%	+		44	48
New Jersey (Central)	0.9%	2.8%	-	++	20	49
St. Louis	0.7%			+	45	50



Source: CBRE, Oxford Economics, and Green Street Advisors. Forecasts represent annualized numbers.

II. Major Risk Factors

Keep One Eye Open: Times are still good for apartment investors relative to many property types. However, like any business, risks remain and the following is a list of key issues that bear watching over the coming years. The most likely risk to apartments seem cyclical in nature (new supply outstripping demand), but other idiosyncratic risks (namely rent control) have grown in recent years.




- Job growth slowed modestly in '19 from the fantastic pace of the last few years, but remained strong enough to allow for absorption of elevated new supply in most markets. Should job growth decelerate meaningfully, investors will see pockets of oversupply spread quickly. Charlotte, Orlando, and Jacksonville appear most at-risk of oversupply in '20.
- Third-party forecasters continue to paint an overly rosy supply growth picture for the next three years. Development remains historically high and is unlikely to slow meaningfully. Apartments are a solid, readily financeable business versus other sectors. The downside to these positive traits: developers will develop until the capital spigot shuts off.
- In most markets, apartment cap rates edged lower throughout '19, along with the broader decline in interest rates observed since late-'18. Apartment yields are attractive versus prevailing bond rates, but a rapid rise in interest rates would still carry negative implications for asset values, particularly if inflation and rent growth do not follow.
- Political pressure from affordable housing advocates is unlikely to abate, with coastal markets facing the greatest risk. In '19, NYC landlords fell into the crosshairs of new rent regulation with a painful outcome for owners of non-institutional rent stabilized buildings, and a benign impact for most institutional owners of market-rate units. In '20, California voters will likely have another chance to repeal statewide limits on rent control come election day.

- Since the housing bust, mortgage credit has been granted to only the best borrowers and has only loosened marginally the past few years. Expanding mortgage availability could serve as bi-partisan low-hanging fruit among regulators to boost the economy.
- Housing reform is underway, but is in the early innings and will likely be a multi-year process. GSE multifamily lending activity in '20 should prove accommodative enough to provide ample liquidity to the transaction market. Beyond '20, it's reasonable to expect a reduction of Fannie/Freddie support, but meaningful declines in volume will likely remain a tough political sell. Mandates could also shift quickly under a new administration.

IIIa. Apartment 101: The Basics

Housing America: There are 330 million people living in the U.S. today housed in approximately 120 million dwellings, including approximately 19 million apartment units in buildings with 5 or more units. Institutional-quality apartments, which exclude affordable housing and properties outside the top 100 markets, account for ~14 million units, or 12% of the total U.S. housing stock.



123 Million Occupied Housing Units

Types of Apartment Buildings

High-Rise



High-rise apartment buildings typically have more than ten stories and are located in downtown submarkets of larger cities.

Mid-Rise



Mid-rise apartment buildings typically stand between four and ten stories and are often located in suburbs of larger cities.

Garden



Garden-style apartment buildings with landscaped gardens or lawns are two or three story complexes generally located in the suburbs.

Subsidized




Government-subsidized apartments for people with low-to-moderate incomes can range widely from highrise buildings in urban submarkets to garden style buildings in the suburbs.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Green Street Advisors.

IIIb. Apartment 101: Assessing Asset Quality

A Price Point for Everyone: There are a variety of factors that affect the rent level of apartment buildings within an MSA, including: location, physical quality, school system, amenities, access to public transportation, unit finishes, local economic conditions (including incomes), and the owner's operating abilities. Rent levels are a good proxy for asset quality within a market.



Quality Scores - An Example of Average Rents in Los Angeles*



^{*}Los Angeles rents are an average of various bedroom floor plans

Source: CBRE, Green Street Advisors, US Census.


IIIc. Apartment 101: The Players

Fragmented: REIT ownership of institutional-quality apartments is limited, and has declined over time due to consolidation in the space. Unlike other sectors where REITs tend to possess a meaningful cost-of-debt advantage, Fannie/Freddie's presence in multifamily diminishes the REITs' advantage. REIT portfolios generally tilt toward higher-rent assets within a given market relative to private market peers.

% of Real Estate Owned by REITs

80% **Malls** 15% **Senior Housing** Self-Storage 15% Non-Mall Retail 10% Industrial 5-10% Lodging 5-10% Office 5-10% **Apartments** <5%

REIT Equity Market Cap (\$B)



Top 50 Apartment Owners

(Portfolio data as of 1/1/19 - bold denotes publicly traded REITs)*


(i ortionala	a a3 01 1/1/13	Doid de	choices publicly traded RETTS)	
Name	Units		Name	Units
1 MAA	100,900	26	Invesco Real Estate	35,400
2 AvalonBay Communities, Inc.	82,000	27	American Campus Communities	33,500
3 Equity Residential	80,300	28	Dominium	33,300
4 Starwood Capital Group	76,900	29	Steadfast Companies	31,000
5 Related Companies	69,300	30	Harbor Group International, LLC	30,700
6 Edward Rose Building Enterprise	64,700	31	Westdale Real Estate Investment & Managem	29,400
7 Essex Property Trust, Inc.	62,500	32	FPA Multifamily	28,800
8 Greystar Real Estate Partners	62,000	33	GID	28,500
9 The Irvine Company	60,600	34	Heitman	28,000
10 Hunt Companies	60,200	35	Carroll Organization	27,600
11 BH Equities, LLC	58,400	36	JRK Property Holdings	26,300
12 Lincoln Property Company	58,400	37	Bridge Investment Group	26,300
13 Camden Property Trust	58,200	38	AEW Capital Management, L.P.	25,800
14 PGIM Real Estate	56,400	39	Southern Management Corporation	25,300
15 Weidner Apartment Homes	52,600	40	Northland Investment Corporation	25,000
16 Balfour Beatty Communities	51,300	41	Sentinel Real Estate Corporation	25,000
17 JPMorgan Asset Management	51,200	42	TruAmerica Multifamily, LLC	24,500
18 UDR, Inc.	51,100	43	AMLI Residential	24,200
19 Cortland	51,000	44	American Landmark/Electra America	24,000
20 Morgan Properties	50,700	45	Eaton Vance Management	23,700
21 Monarch Investment & Management Group	49,800	46	AIG Global Real Estate Investment Corp.	23,300
22 Michaels Development Company	49,500	47	Knighvest Capital	22,700
23 Nuveen Real Estate	38,400	48	ROCO Real Estate	21,100
24 UBS Realty Investors LLC	38,400	49	The NRP Group	20,700
25 Aimco	33,500	50	Berkshire Residential Investments	20,500

Source: Company documents, NAREIT, NMHC, and Green Street Advisors. *Data as of 1/1/19 and does not reflect larger portfolio sales and acquisitions in '19.

IIId. Apartment 101: Industry Consolidation

Darwinism at Work: Apartments are a highly scalable business. The adoption of centralized revenue management systems, call centers, and operations teams over the last ~25 years allowed companies to manage ever larger portfolios with limited incremental field personnel. The scalability and a growing divide in operating efficiency between small and large players prompted a consolidation wave. Today, only seven of the twenty public REITs that existed in '95 remain. The odds of further REIT privatizations or public-to-public mergers will remain fluid over the coming years, but are currently low.

Apartment Consolidation (Notable Transactions)



Source: Company Disclosures and Green Street Advisors.

IVa. The Forces Shaping Apartment Demand

The Demand Waterfall: Household formations are a key measure of aggregate housing demand. A household's choice between an apartment or single-family home, and whether to rent or buy, is predicated on financial situations and lifestyle needs. Green Street's base case anticipates demand growth of 5.7 million total housing units over the next five years, ~10% below the robust pace observed over the previous five years. However, renters are only expected to represent 20-25% of this net demand, as homeownership stabilizes. Approximately 500,000 new households are expected to rent apartments by 2024.


Population Growth Immigration Demographics Job / Income Growth **Net Household Formations** ('20E-'24E cumulative) Base Case: +5.7 million (10% below last 5 yrs) **Homeowners** Renters Base Case: +4.4 million Base Case: +1.3 million Households are constantly (~45% below last 5 yrs) switching from owners to (~10% above last 5 yrs) renters and vice versa. Our analysis captures the net Renter Capture Rate: Owner Capture Rate: impact. LT Average: 37% LT Average: 63% Last 5 Years: 36% Last 5 years: 64% '20E-'24E Base Case: 22% '20E-'24E Base Case: 78% Homeownership Rate 64.4% in '19 to 65.0% in '24 **Other Rentals Apartment Rentals** ('20-'24E cumulative) ('20-'24E cumulative) Single-Family Rental: +715k Base Case: +500k Townhome & Manuf. Housing: +45k


2020E - 2024E Housing Demand Forecast

Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Green Street Advisors.

IVb. Demand: Households & Homeownership

Growth is Good: Household formations in '19 were near the 35-year average and met our expectations. Our 5-year forecast is largely unchanged. Still-favorable population growth trends and decent job growth should lead to solid, though decelerating, household formations in the coming years. Homeownership surprised marginally higher versus our expectations in '19. The homeownership rate is expected to largely trend sideways through 2024, due to affordability issues for prospective first-time homebuyers.






Our homeownership rate forecast contemplates population growth and propensity to own by age and birth cohorts. From '06-'16, the homeownership rate declined by an average of 50 bps per year. However in '17 and '18, the homeownership rate surprised to the upside and registered its first increases in ~12 years, driven by a modest revival of home buying among 25-34 year olds, which continued in '19.


Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Green Street Advisors. Forecasts by Green Street Advisors.

IVc. Demand: Employment

Still Solid: Job growth is the primary driver of near-term apartment fundamentals. Employment growth moderated in '19, but remains supportive of apartment fundamentals. The expected pace of deceleration in '20 and beyond, while not alarming in isolation, may prove problematic if the apartment construction pipeline does not begin to slow. West Coast and Sun Belt markets still enjoy higher absolute job growth, but have not been immune to the modest slowdown in hiring.

Total Nonfarm Job Growth Monthly Pace (000's)






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IVd. Demand: Wage Growth and Affordability


Wage Growth Kicking In: Historically, job growth and income growth have been closely correlated. Wage growth lagged job growth during the early part of the recovery, but has accelerated in the past few years. Growing wages has lent some relief to affordability pressures in several markets as rent as a percentage of income continues to ease gradually from peak '16 levels. Rent-to-income ratios are in line with historical levels in the majority of markets and should continue to improve.




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IVe. Demand: Demographics


Aging Renters: Demographic shifts, while slow moving, can have large impacts on housing demand. Beginning in '20, the prime renter demographic – 25-34 year olds – is expected to grow at a rate below that of the broader population for the first time since '07. Millennials renting longer and downsizing Baby Boomers will provide some support to apartment demand, but aging demographics should still be a net drag on apartment consumption over the next five years relative to the last five years.






Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Green Street Advisors.

What Goes Up...: The "millennial boom" that has supported apartment fundamentals this cycle is fading. The 25-29-year-old population should begin to experience net declines in '20, and the broader 25-34-year-old population should cross over into negative territory in '25 for the first time since '03. The SFR sector stands to benefit from the aging of today's apartment renters (average SFR tenant age is ~40). However, the degree to which SFR demand benefits will depend on this cohort's propensity and ability to own.






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
Grow Up Peter Pan: The share of young adults living with parents, as well as the propensity to have roommates, continues to show little signs of reversion toward historical levels previously anticipated. An uncoupling of roommates and/or parents would represent a large source of pent up demand for apartments, but the "great uncoupling" appears to be a lower probability event. Doubling up with roommates continues to be disproportionately common along the coasts.




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Crowded (out) Housing: Student loan debt has grown at an 11% annual rate since '04 to \$1.5 trillion, as both the number of borrowers and amount per loan have steadily increased. Roughly seven million borrowers are severely delinquent on their student debt, suggesting future access to mortgages for much of this group will be impaired (represents ~8% of rental housing stock assuming folks double up). An ~11% delinquency rate is eye popping in light of ostensibly rosy economic times. Student debt is the only form of debt that has not seen an improvement in delinquency rates during this cycle's recovery.






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
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Renters for Life? Despite a ~10-year bull market, the balance sheets of many renters have actually deteriorated in recent years. Many have found themselves on the wrong side of compounding interest, servicing non-mortgage related debt while missing out on massive appreciation in home prices and financial assets. The cohort that was 25-34 during the housing bust is likely to have an impaired homeownership rate through most of their adult lives. The homeownership rate for today's 25-34 year old households should continue to see greater improvement, but will likely remain restrained versus historical levels.



Change in Homeownership Rates by Age Cohort Since 1990 (bps), Current Homeownership Rate and Estimates




Source: CDC, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, and U.S. Census Bureau.


IVf. Demand: Apartment Turnover

Bouncing Along the Bottom: For a third consecutive year, apartment turnover rates came in lower-than-expected in '19. Home buying activity among renters remains muted (even in more affordable Sun Belt markets) and the concessionary environment, which can incentivize renters to move, remained rational. Turnover rates have appeared to find a bottom at historically low levels, but a dramatic pick up from here seems unlikely.

Annualized Gross Turnover - Apartments



Move-Out-to-Buy




Source: Company disclosure (weighted by REIT unit count).


IVg. Demand: The Single-Family Market

Restrained: Following a rapid slowdown in late-'18, single-family home sales activity reaccelerated modestly in '19, but remain ~20% below early-2000s levels on a per-capita basis. Tight inventories are pushing home prices higher, but the pace of annual appreciation has slowed to the low-3% range versus the mid-5% average observed over the prior three years. Within a given market, lower-priced homes are seeing outsized appreciation while high-end home prices have begun to stagnate and even decline in some coastal markets.

Single-Family Home Sales and Months Supply of Inventory




Home Prices vs. Mortgage Rates



Source: Fannie Mae, Federal Reserve, Freddie Mac, National Association of Realtors, U.S. Census Bureau, and Green Street Advisors.

IVg. Demand: The Single-Family Market (cont'd)

Savings Gap: Homeownership has become increasingly less affordable over the last several years, as home price appreciation has outstripped wage gains and wealth accumulation for a large share of prospective homebuyers. Affordability is often measured by the mortgage-to-rent ratio and NAR affordability index. Neither are a great predictor of home buying activity as both presuppose 1) credit access, which has been much tighter in recent years, and 2) that a household can afford the down payment. Barring a meaningful expansion of low-down payment lending, the lack of down payment savings will continue to be an anchor on home buying.




*NAR Methodology: Affordability index of 100 indicates a family with a median income has exactly enough income to qualify for a mortgage on a median priced home in a particular market, assuming a 20% down payment and a 25% qualifying income (i.e. monthly P&I payment cannot exceed 25% of median family monthly income). A score of 120.0 means a family earning the median family income has 120% of the income necessary to qualify for a conventional loan covering 80 percent of a median-priced existing single-family home. An increase in the score then shows that this family is more able to afford the median priced home.


GSA Methodology: Mortgage payment based on current rates for 30-year, fixed rate loan, assumes 80% LTV, and includes principal, interest, property taxes, tax savings on mortgage interest and property taxes, repair and maintenance of 1% of home price, and the difference in cost between homeowners and renters insurance. The median market-level rents used in the calculations above (i.e.. the denominator) have been adjusted upwards in this year's outlook to reflect a greater share of 2-and 3-bedroom Source: CBRE, Federation of Tax Administrators, Freddie Mac, Insurance Information Institute, National Association of Realtors, RealtyTrac, Tax Foundation, and Green Street Advisors.

IVg. Demand: The Single-Family Market (cont'd)

No Bubble Here: Mortgage lending remains restrained relative to the early-2000's. Within a smaller total mortgage origination pie, lower-credit consumers represent a significantly smaller share of borrowers (e.g., <660 FICO share down 60% vs. '06). In light of historically low mortgage delinquency rates, it's reasonable to assume that banks will seek to expand mortgage access at the margins (if not, shadow lenders will). However, there are no current indicators of a meaningful loosening of the lending environment that could potentially jeopardize apartment or SFR operating fundamentals.




Residential Mortgage Lending Standards




Source: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, National Association of Home Builders, National Association of Realtors, U.S. Census Bureau, and Green Street Advisors.

IVh. Demand: Single-Family Rental Landscape

Renting the Dream: The single-family rental sector (SFR) experienced a surge out of the downturn as the majority of foreclosed homes transitioned to SFR units. More recently, growth has slowed as the housing market settled into a new equilibrium of balanced growth between SFR and apartment renters, and homeowners. Tighter lending, lack of down-payment savings, and anemic starter-home construction will continue to support solid SFR fundamentals. Conditions on these fronts are poised to only improve marginally, and the demographic wave of 35-44 year-olds is in the early innings.








Source: National Association of Realtors, U.S. Census Bureau, and Green Street Advisors.


IVh. Demand: Single-Family Rental Landscape (cont'd)

Low-Beta: Due to differing geographic footprints and tenant lifestyle preferences, only a modest amount of competition exists between institutional-quality apartments and SFR (some competition in suburban Sun Belt markets.) In the early innings of its institutional life, SFR fundamentals have proven more stable during times of economic shocks versus apartments. Houston provided a case study during the brief energy recession of '15 and '16, where SFR REIT rent growth remained in positive territory while suburban and urban apartments saw low to mid-single digit declines.

Institutional SFR Heat Map vs. Houston Apartment REIT Portfolios*



Houston YoY Rent Growth- Apartment vs. Single-Family Rental





*Includes properties from: CPT, MAA, UDR. Heat blur represents public and private institutional quality SFR operators

Source: Company disclosure and Green Street Advisors. Heat map based off of Green Street's proprietary SFR database.

V. Multifamily Supply Landscape

Full Capacity: Absent a meaningful lock-up in the capital markets, apartment construction should continue to come out of the ground at a similar elevated pace over the next five years as experienced in '18 and '19. Development profit margins (20-30%) are still attractive versus other real estate uses, and if anything, improved throughout '19 thanks to a decline in cap rates in many markets. While multifamily construction on a per-capita basis sits ~20% above 2000 levels, single-family construction is ~40% below last cycle's pace.






Source: NAHB, National Association of Realtors, NMHC, U.S. Census Bureau, and Green Street Advisors. Forecasts by Green Street Advisors.


V. Multifamily Supply Landscape (cont'd)


Heading Down South: Within the steady national supply pipeline, coastal markets should see a moderation in deliveries over the next few years, while several key Sun Belt markets will see an acceleration. The absorption of elevated new supply in the Sun Belt exceeded our expectations throughout '19, but the risk of oversupply will continue to rise as developers bet that the combination of 1) recent blistering pace of job growth and 2) restrained homeownership trends continue over the next several years.



VI. Fundamentals: Operating Expenses

Inflation Plus: Apartment REITs have done a solid job controlling expenses this cycle. Expense growth of ~3.0%, on average (~80 bps north of CPI) is a decent betting line for the coming years. The two largest expense categories, property taxes and payroll, will continue to see pressure from recent asset value appreciation and a tight labor market, respectively. Initiatives to lower headcount in the field are underway, but meaningful benefits are likely several years away.





Source: Company documents and Green Street Advisors.

VII. Capital Expenditures

Different Buckets: The upkeep and improvement of apartment assets can be expensed on the income statement or capitalized to the balance sheet. Items that are capitalized generally come in three varieties: 1) recurring, 2) infrequent or "non-recurring", and 3) revenue-enhancing. The classifications are arbitrary (they all represent cash out the door), and Green Street's cap-ex-reserve accounts for all three of these expenditures.

Repair and Maintenance Expenses								
Description	Typical Items	Bucket						
Small dollar projects. Most tenant turnover costs fall into this bucket.	Interior painting, landscaping, snow removal, small dollar repairs.	Operating Expenses						


Capital Expenditures							
1. Recurring	2. Infrequent / "Non- Recurring"	3. Revenue-Enhancing *					
	Description						
Expenditures that exceed a certain dollar amount are capitalized to an asset's gross carrying value. Policies and dollar triggers vary between REITs.	"Non-recurring" is a misnomer; "infrequent" is a better descriptor. Generally consists of big-ticket items with longer useful lives.	Money spent beyond maintenance cap-ex that improves an asset's competitive position. In reality, a portion of "revenue-enhancing" spend is simply deferred "recurring cap-ex".					
	Typical Items						
Floor coverings, appliances, cabinetry, and exterior painting.	New roofs, parking lot paving, HVAC, and window replacement.	Kitchen and bath upgrades, televisions, extensive exterior / interior work, new amenities.					
	Bucket						
	1						
Cap-Ex Reserve							

^{*} Note: The analysis in this report does not include assets undergoing full-scale redevelopment for which units are removed from same-store pools

VII. Capital Expenditures (cont'd)


A Little Less Costly: Green Street's apartment cap-ex reserve of ~13% of NOI is slightly less burdensome than most commercial property types. There is a wide range of cap-ex requirements around the average, dependent on property age (younger = cheaper) and geography. All else equal, coastal markets offer a more attractive cap-ex profile versus Sun Belt regions thanks to 1) higher average rents absorbing relatively similar fixed costs, and 2) a greater proportion of asset value residing in the land versus depreciating structure.

Green Street's Cap-Ex Reserves as % of NOI




Average Annual Cap-Ex per Unit by Market

(Apartment REITs: Trailing 5 years)



Average Annual Cap-Ex Spent per Unit by Property Age


(AVB, AIV, CPT, EQR, and UDR: Trailing 5 years)




Source: Public REIT documents and Green Street Advisors.

VIII. Gateway vs. Non-Gateway: Growth and IRRs

Convergence in Growth: Over the last twenty years, apartment properties in gateway markets (Boston, D.C., Los Angeles, New York, Seattle, and Bay Area) have enjoyed substantially better M-RevPAF growth versus other markets, on average. However, the recent track record has become more checkered, as the combination of excellent job growth in non-gateway markets and elevated supply on the coasts has led to better growth in non-gateway markets through much of the current cycle. Over the next five years, we expect coastal markets to outperform modestly, but not to the degree observed in the '90's and early-2000's.




Gateway markets should slightly outperform over the long term, as they retain their dual status as being magnets for income growth and possessing greater constraints on adding housing supply. Political risks are a wildcard, but have not yet meaningfully changed our long-term growth assumptions.



Source: CBRE and Green Street Advisors.

VIII. Gateway vs. Non-Gateway: Growth and IRRs (cont'd)

Tilt Toward the Coasts: A dramatic compression in cap rates in Sun Belt markets over the last few years has resulted in long-term risk-adjusted IRRs becoming incrementally attractive in coastal markets. Long-term NOI growth in gateway markets is expected to outpace non-gateway markets by ~90 bps on average, a much narrower spread than the historical track record. The D.C. metro, which screens attractively under the current macroeconomic backdrop and would be a large relative winner in an economic downturn, is our top market of choice for private apartment investors today.





*Cap rate for B/B+ asset, based on forward 12-mo. NOI, w/ GSA-estimated cap-ex reserve and 3% mgmt. fee.

Source: CBRE and Green Street Advisors.

IX. Transaction and Financing Markets

Cranking Along: The apartment transaction market is firing on all cylinders. Debt and equity capital remains plenty, and the breadth of stability in operating fundamentals improved in '19, bolstering confidence in underwriting assumptions. Transaction volumes in '19 accelerated versus a year ago in most markets. The only outlier to an otherwise sanguine backdrop is non-institutional rent-regulated stock in New York City. The transaction market, particularly for older properties, has slowed to a crawl following recently strengthened rent regulations.






Source: Real Capital Analytics Inc.

IX. Transaction and Financing Markets (cont'd)

Spread Investing: Private and public apartment owners enjoyed increasingly accommodative debt markets in late-'19. After a mid-year lull, GSE activity picked back up in conjunction with fresh loan targets from the FHFA. Balance sheet lenders remain aggressive on pricing, and REIT unsecured rates are bouncing around record lows. Beyond '20, we expect a modest pullback in GSE lending.



'15

'16

'17

Freddie Mac Fannie Mae

'13


'12

'11

110

The Latest on the GSEs

In late-'19, Fannie and Freddie's administrator – the Federal Housing and Finance Administration (FHFA) – published its '20 scorecard, which effectively establishes loan volume caps for the GSEs' multifamily activity. The caps allow for an aggregate \$40 billion in GSE-backed lending per quarter through '20. Affordable loans must represent a minimum of 38% of overall activity. The caps are high enough to accommodate similar levels of institutional-quality apartment financing that has prevailed in recent years. Beyond '20, it's reasonable to expect the head of the FHFA to attempt to gradually shrink the GSE footprint as it relates to conventional apartments. However, the timing and magnitude of any shift is highly uncertain given how quickly the political landscape (and administrations) can change.



'18


'19


'20

Source: CBRE, Real Capital Analytics, and Green Street Advisors. GSE= Government-Sponsored Enterprise

X. Asset Values

Creeping Higher: After losing a third of value peak-to-trough during the Great Recession, average values for institutional-quality apartments are now $\sim 55\%$ above '07 peak levels, compared to $\sim 30\%$ for core property types. The spread between Sun Belt and coastal cap rates continues to compress, reaching new lows (~ 35 bps spread vs. 10-yr avg. of ~ 95 bps).







660 Newport Center Drive, Suite 800, Newport Beach, CA 92660

Important disclosure on page 44

X. Asset Values (cont'd)

Cheap vs. Bonds: A recent bull run for bond prices leaves most commercial real estate property types, including apartments, screening cheap relative to fixed income alternatives. Within commercial real estate, apartment valuations appear fair. Apartments offer attractive returns versus many other major property types, but less compelling returns versus some niche property types (e.g., Manufactured Homes, Data Centers).






No Valuation Comparison to Treasuries: Green Street evaluates private-market real estate pricing (i.e., buy-and-hold unlevered return expectations) against long-maturity investment-grade corporate bonds and high-yield corporates — investments that historically have offered returns similar to those available on real estate. A comparison with Treasuries is not presented in this report. The spread of real estate returns to Treasuries provides a very broad measure of the risk premium offered by real estate and it is heavily influenced by the health of the economy. Using corporate bonds as the benchmark eliminates some, though not all, of the macro risk from the comparison (corporate bonds tend to widen relative to Treasuries when the economy weakens and vice versa) and better answers the question, "how is real estate priced relative to assets with similar risk?"


Source: Bloomberg and Green Street Advisors.

XI. Return History and Relative Valuation

Private Market – Average Returns: In the private market, apartments have turned in an average performance over the last twenty-six years. Private market data is somewhat noisy and the relative level of return between sectors will vary based on the time frame observed. Past returns across most sectors have been boosted by high starting yields and cap rate compression; future returns should be lower.




Public Market – Great Performance: Over the last twenty-six years, apartment REITs have outperformed the major sectors. While the performance of the underlying properties has a meaningful impact on long-term REIT total returns, differences in balance sheet management helps explain the sizable gap between sectors.




Source: FTSE/NAREIT Indices (public-market returns); NCREIF (private-market returns). NCREIF data is thru 3Q19 (Annualized).

XI. Return History and Relative Valuation (cont'd)

Still Attractive: Apartments are attractively priced versus most major property types. The combination of strong NOI growth and below-average cap-ex justifies slightly lower cap rates. The appropriate cap rate spread between apartments and major sectors is roughly reflected in the public market, but not quite there in the private market.



Cap Rates - Apartments vs. Major Sectors



The unlevered sector returns shown above are higher than the market-level IRRs on page 32 as they are based on a REIT-weighted portfolio, which is comprised of higher quality properties disproportionately located in markets and submarkets with higher long-term NOI growth prospects


*Apartment rents are less sensitive to changes in the economy relative to other sectors


Source: Company documents, NCREIF, and Green Street Advisors.

Appendices

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A.	Composition of U.S. Housing Stock	40		
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Appendix A: Composition of U.S. Housing Stock





Source: 2017 American Housing Survey, CoreLogic, U.S. Census Bureau, and Green Street Advisors.

■Owned ■ Rented

3 BR

2 BR

2BR

■1-4 Units for Rent

Studio/1BR

0

190

3+ BR

For Sale

4 BR+

0

Studio/1BR

■5+ Units (Apt) for Rent


Appendix B: Apartment REIT NOI Concentrations by Market

	NOI Concentration							
MSA	AIV	AVB	СРТ	EQR	ESS	MAA	UDR	Total
1 D.C. Metro	13%	14%	16%	17%		4%	19%	12%
2 Los Angeles	17%	13%	4%	18%	19%		4%	12%
3 Seattle	1%	6%		10%	17%		9%	7%
4 Boston	13%	12%		10%			9%	7%
5 San Francisco	7%	6%		10%	9%		8%	6%
6 San Jose	2%	8%		6%	20%		4%	6%
7 Orange County	3%	4%	5%	4%	10%		15%	6%
8 New York	3%	6%		11%			8%	5%
9 Oakland-East Bay	2%	6%		5%	12%			4%
10 San Diego	7%	2%	2%	4%	8%			3%
11 Dallas / Fort Worth			6%			13%	5%	3%
12 Atlanta	1%		9%			13%		3%
13 New Jersey (Northern)	1%	5%		3%				2%
14 Tampa-St. Petersburg			4%			6%	4%	2%
15 Orlando			6%			6%	3%	2%
16 Denver	5%	1%	6%	2%				1%
17 Houston			10%			4%		1%
18 Charlotte			5%			7%		1%
19 Austin			4%			7%	1%	1%
20 Nashville	1%					5%	3%	1%
21 Raleigh-Durham			4%			5%		1%
22 Long Island		5%						1%
23 Phoenix			7%			3%		1%
24 Baltimore	1%	1%	1%				2%	1%
25 New Jersey (Central)		3%						1%
26 Miami	5%		3%					1%
27 Philadelphia	7%							1%
28 Inland Empire			2%	1%			1%	1%
29 Richmond						2%	2%	0%
30 Jacksonville						3%		0%
31 Fort Lauderdale	1%		3%					0%
32 Chicago	4%							0%
33 Palm Beach		1%	1%					0%
34 Memphis						1%		0%
35 San Antonio						1%		0%
36 Minneapolis	1%							0%
Other U.S. Markets	4%	6%	1%	1%	5%	20%	4%	5%
Total:	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


Source: Company documents and Green Street Advisors.

Appendix C: Apartment Submarket Grades

Submarket Grades: Green Street assigns letter grades to 708 submarkets across the top 50 MSAs. Grades range from A++ to D, and are meant to represent relative long-term rent growth potential.



Variables: Grades are based on ten variables at the zip code level and then rolled up by submarket. Variable weightings are proprietary, and some grades include a subjective adjustment.



Source: Great Schools, Oxford Economics, U.S. Census Bureau, Walk Score, and Green Street Advisors.

U.S. Apartn	nent Outlook -	- Januaru	17.	2020
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Total Return of Green Street's Recommendations ^{1,2}							
Year ³	Buy	Hold	Sell	Universe			
2019	31.6%	22.4%	17.8%	24.0%			
2018	-5.1%	-6.6%	-9.2%	-7.0%			
2017	6.4%	0.2%	2.1%	2.6%			
2016	14.9%	14.7%	13.1%	14.4%			
2015	8.3%	0.9%	-1.7%	2.4%			
2014	41.6%	31.5%	27.3%	33.3%			
2013	4.1%	0.6%	1.7%	2.2%			
2012	24.5%	24.7%	18.9%	23.0%			
2011	18.9%	7.6%	-4.7%	7.6%			
2010	43.3%	32.8%	26.6%	33.8%			
2009	59.0%	47.7%	6.0%	37.9%			
2008	-28.1%	-30.9%	-52.6%	-37.3%			
2007	-6.9%	-22.4%	-27.8%	-19.7%			
2005	45.8%	29.6%	19.5%	31.6%			
2005	25.3%	18.5%	-1.8%	15.9%			
2004	42.8%	28.7%	16.4%	29.4%			
2003	43.3%	37.4%	21.8%	34.8%			
2002	17.3%	2.8%	2.6%	5.4%			
2001	34.9%	19.1%	13.0%	21.1%			
2000	53.4%	28.9%	5.9%	29.6%			
1999	12.3%	-9.0%	-20.5%	-6.9%			
1998	-1.6%	-15.1%	-15.5%	-12.1%			
1997	35.7%	14.8%	7.2%	18.3%			
1995	47.6%	30.7%	18.9%	32.1%			
1995	22.9%	13.9%	0.5%	13.5%			
1994	20.8%	-0.8%	-8.7%	3.1%			
1993	27.3%	4.7%	8.1%	12.1%			
Cumulative Total Return	21133.4%	1353.7%	42.0%	1617.6%			

The results shown above are hypothetical; they do not represent the actual trading of securities. Actual performance will var y from the hypothetical performance shown above due to, but not limited to 1) advisory fees and other expenses that one would pay; 2) transaction costs; 3) the inability to execute trades at the last published price (the hypothetical returns assume execution at the last closing price); 4) the inability to maintain an equally-weighted portfolio in size (the returns above assume an equal weighting); and 5) market and economic factors will almost certainly cause one to invest differently than projected by the model that simulated the above returns. All returns include the reinvestment of dividends. Past performance, particularly hypothetical performance, cannot be used to predict future performance, involves risk and possible loss of principal capital.

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(2) Beginning July 5, 2017, the returns for each year cover the period following the first RESM issued in the filter RESM issued in the following year and are not based on a calendar year. Subsequent to July 5, 2017, returns are based on calendar months.

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